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Abstract
In recent years the European Union (EU) has sought to develop a far-reaching policy 
regarding persons with disabilities. However, to date, EU non-discrimination legisla-
tion does not provide any clear legal definition of what constitutes a disability. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has attempted to fill this gap and, in 
several decisions, has elaborated on the concept of disability and its meaning under 
EU law. The CJEU, with reference to the application of the Employment Equality 
Directive, has explained the notion of disability mainly by comparing and contrasting 
it to the concept of sickness. Against this background, this article critically discusses 
recent case law and attempts to highlight that, even though the Court has firmly 
embraced the social model of disability envisaged by the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, the boundaries between the concepts of sickness and dis-
ability remain blurred.
* This article is the product of a joint reflection. However, Sections 1, 2 and 6 have been written 
by Delia Ferri and Sections 3, 4 and 5 have been written by Silvia Favalli, while Section 7 has 
been written jointly. Our special thanks go to Mr. Charles O’Sullivan and Dr Fergus Ryan for 
their helpful remarks and comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
Despite the recent expansion of disability studies and the great surge of inter-
est in ‘disability’ across various strands of legal literature, as yet, there is no 
shared understanding of what constitutes a disability in a normative sense. In 
the European context, the lack of uniformity in scholarship mirrors a similar 
lack of a clear and univocal legal definition of disability in European Union 
(EU) law, as well as the fact that Member States define disability in different 
ways under their own national legal framework.1 In other words, although 
the EU has developed a far-reaching disability policy,2 it has implicitly left the 
uneasy task of identifying the criteria to define a ‘person with disabilities’ to 
national legislation.3
1   M. Leonardi, ‘Defining disability — Re-defining policy’, International Journal of Integrated 
Care (2009), 22 June 2009, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2707551/, 
retrieved 14 April 2015.
2    Amongst others, L. Waddington, From Rome to Nice in a Wheelchair. The Development of 
a European Disability Policy (Maastricht: Europa Law Publishing, 2006); L. Waddington, 
‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences’, Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 18(4) (2011) 431-453; D. Hosking, ‘Staying the Course: The European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020’, in: L. Waddington, G. Quinn and E. Flynn (eds.), European 
Yearbook of Disability Law 4(2013) pp. 73-99; D. Ferri, ‘Is there a ‘Cultural Dimension’ of EU 
Disability Policy? New Perspectives after the Accession to the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’, in: L. Zagato, D. Costantini, F. Perocco (eds.), Trasformazioni e 
crisi della cittadinanza sociale (Venice: Venice University Press, 2014) pp. 241-268. 
3    Notable is the exception of State aid law: see Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 
17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in appli-
cation of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA relevance [2014] OJ L 187/1. This 
regulation (Art. 2) refers to ‘worker with disabilities’ as those who are recognized ‘worker 
with disabilities under national law’; or ‘has long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sen-
sory impairment(s) which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and 
effective participation in a work environment on an equal basis with other workers’. The 
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Current EU legislation includes disability-related provisions in various 
areas, such as transport,4 lifts,5 public procurement,6 State aid7 and electronic 
communications networks and services.8 However, the quest and need for a 
uniform definition of disability across the EU has only emerged prominently 
in the non-discrimination field, in particular in relation to Directive 2000/78/
EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment and occupation (‘Employment Equality Directive’).9 
At first sight, it might be surprising that the discussion has been confined to 
the non-discrimination field and did not extend to other areas, in stark con-
trast with the general need for the uniform application of EU law. However, 
this is due to the fact that the definition of the ground of disability is of para-
mount importance to determine the actual scope of the Employment Equality 
Directive ratione personae, and to define the limits of the non-discrimination 
protection in the EU legal order. In fact, only a uniform definition of disability 
second alinea of this Article is clearly inspired by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (see infra Section 2).
4    See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 on the harmoniza-
tion of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation, 
[2006] OJ L 377/1; Directive 2006/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 laying down technical requirements for inland waterway vessels and 
repealing Council Directive 82/714/ EEC, [2006] OJ L 389/1; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 8/2008 of 11 December 2007 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 as regards 
common technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable to commercial 
transportation by airplane, [2008] OJ L 10/1; Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by 
rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 1191/69 and 1107/70, [2007] 
OJ L 315/1; Regulation (EC) No. 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, [2007] OJ L 315/14; Regulation (EC) 
No. 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 concerning the 
rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air, [2006] 
OJ L 204/1.
5    Directive 95/16/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to lifts, 
[1995] OJ L 213/1.
6    Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, [2004] OJ L 134/1; Directive 2004/18/EC 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, [2004] OJ L 134/114.
7    Supra note 3.
8    Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communica-
tions networks and services (Universal Service Directive), [2002] OJ L 108/51.
9    [2000] OJ L 303/16.
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allows Member States to adopt a fair basis for differential treatment10 consis-
tent across the EU. The importance of defining what constitutes a disability 
in the non- discrimination field has been perceived since the adoption of the 
Employment Equality Directive. Acknowledging the potential risk of an incon-
sistent implementation of the Directive, the European Commission itself, in 
2002, launched and financed a research project on ‘Definitions of Disability’. 
The project, which asked for a comparative analysis of the definitions of dis-
ability used in cash benefits and employment services provisions across the 
EU, highlighted that there are definitions which differ from a Member States 
to another.11
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been called upon 
several times to provide a consistent interpretation of the meaning of disabil-
ity, as a ground of discrimination, on the assumption that EU provisions must 
be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union. 
In many cases, the Court has tried to define disability by comparing and con-
trasting this concept with that of sickness, highlighting the differences in the 
levels of protection against discrimination provided by EU law. CJEU case law 
has been largely boosted by the EU accession to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD or simply ‘the Convention’),12 which 
has become a clear point of reference in the reasoning of the European judges. 
These recent attempts of the CJEU to clarify the meaning of disability have 
boosted the debate among legal scholars. It might be argued that defining 
disability is immaterial or irrelevant to legal research. As several academics 
contend,13 however, the way in which disability is conceived has a decisive 
10    D. Mabbett, ‘Some are More Equal Than Others: Definitions of Disability in Social Policy 
and Discrimination Law in Europe’, Journal of Social Policy 34 (2005) 215-233, p. 216. In 
particular, Mabbet argues that ‘it may not be possible to promote sufficient substantive 
equality without treating some people differently on grounds of disability. If so, it is nec-
essary to have an idea of what constitutes a fair basis for ‘differential treatment’.
11    Study reported by D. Mabbett, ‘Definitions of Disability in Europe. A Comparative Analy-
sis’, Final Report 13 December 2002, a study prepared by Brunel University, UK (European 
Commission), http://www.hiproweb.org/fileadmin/cdroms/Kit_Formation_Services/
documents/Additional/B-Social_policy_and_Disability/B-3_Definition_of_disability_in_
Europe_Brunel_University_2002.pdf, retrieved 14 April 2015.
12    Council Decision 2010/48/EC, [2010] OJ L 23/35. 
13    Ex pluribus P. Auvergnon, ‘Approche juridique du handicap psychique: les enjeux d’une 
définition en droit social’ [A legal approach to psychic disability: issues surrounding a 
definition in social law], ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 6 (2012) 255-266; 
Mabbett, ‘Some Are More Equal than Others’, supra note 10, pp. 215-233; S. Fredman, ‘Does 
Disability Equality Challenge the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?’, in: A. Lawson 
and C. Gooding (eds.), Disability Rights in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2005) pp. 199-219.
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impact on the enforcement of legislation protecting and promoting the rights 
of persons with disabilities.14 In addition, a prescriptive definition is necessary 
to develop consistent public policies.15 Even those, such as Woodhams and 
Corby,16 who advocated for a radical approach that bypasses the requirement 
for a definition, seem to implicitly recognise that the understanding of disabil-
ity directly affects the way in which people with disabilities are regarded and 
treated by state agencies and other bodies.
Against this background, this article discusses which definition of disabil-
ity has emerged within the EU non-discrimination framework. It attempts to 
illustrate the shift from a medical model of disability to a holistic social one.17 
It also examines the efforts to better distinguish the concept of sickness from 
that of disability, which emerge in the most recent decisions adopted by the 
CJEU. It also examines the role of the CRPD in the interpretation of the Court. 
Overall, building on the most recent scholarship,18 this article argues that the 
adoption of a broad notion of disability by the CJEU might correspond to a 
progressive narrowing of the concept of sickness. This, on the one hand, might 
clarify the scope of EU non-discrimination legislation, but, on the other hand, 
it may jeopardize the internal coherence of EU disability law.
Further to this introduction, this article is structured as follows. Before 
addressing in a detailed fashion the CJEU relevant decisions, Section 2 briefly 
discusses the conceptualization of disability within the medical and social 
models. This section is intended to give the reader the necessary background 
to fully appreciate the relevant case law. Section 3 briefly sketches out the EU 
legal framework on disability. It is divided into two subsections, the first of 
which briefly recalls the evolution of EU disability policy, while the second 
one considers the legal sources of EU disability non-discrimination legislation. 
Section 4 provides a succinct overview of the role of sickness in EU health 
and safety at work legislation, which is exclusively focused on preventing 
14    M. Oliver and C. Barnes, The New Politics of Disablement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012) p. 14.
15    Mabbett, ‘Some are More Equal than Others’, supra note 10.
16    C. Woodhams and S. Corby, ‘Defining Disability in Theory and Practice: A Critique of the 
British Disability Discrimination Act 1995’, Journal of Social Policy 32(2) (2003) 159-78.
17    See infra Section 2.
18    Inter alia, A. Venchiarutti, ‘Sistemi multilivello delle fonti e divieto di discriminazione 
per disabilità in ambito europeo’, La nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 9 (2014) 
409-419. See also C. O’Brien, ‘Driving Down Disability Equality? Case C-356/12 Wolfgang 
Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 2 May 2014’, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 21(4) (2014) 723-738; M. Bell, ʻSickness Absence and the Court of Justice: 
Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Lawʼ, European Law 
Journal 21 (2015) 641-656.
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 occupational causes of ill-health. The purpose of both Sections 3 and 4 is to 
give the reader a brief account of the legal framework in which the CJEU’s case 
law fits. Sections 5 and 6 focus on the analysis of the Court’s judgments in a 
chronological fashion. While Section 5 addresses case law preceding the ratifi-
cation of the CRPD, Section 6 centres on more recent decisions and highlights 
the influence of the ratification of the CRPD by the EU on CJEU case law refer-
ring to disability and sickness. Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptualizing Disability: The Medical Model, the Social Model 
and Their Influence on Disability Law
In searching for a clear and prescriptive definition of disability, legal scholars 
acknowledge that disability itself is ‘a reflection of the zeitgeist of a particular 
time or era’,19 and is an evolving concept. Originally and until approximately 
the 1980s, a ‘medical’ perspective was dominant. Disability was conceived 
as an individual deficit deriving from ‘a disease, trauma or health condition 
that impairs or disrupts physiological or cognitive functioning’.20 The ‘medi-
cal model’ focused on the actual health condition of the single person and on 
the treatments that could be provided to ‘repair’ or alleviate the impairment. 
It conceptualized disability as a negative condition, and identified disability 
with an individual impairment completely independent from any other exter-
nal or environmental element. As a consequence, society was split into two 
distinct social groups: one formed by disabled people, passive beneficiaries of 
rehabilitation policies, and the other constituted by the ‘able bodied citizens’, 
who were providing charitable interventions for the former. This particular 
categorization stemming from the medical model inevitably led to a form of 
‘paternalism’,21 that had informed for many years national and international 
disability policies.22
19    C.E. Drum, ‘Models and Approaches to Disability’, in: C.E. Drum, G.L. Krahn and, 
H. Bersani Jr. (eds.), Disability and Public Health, American Public Health Association/
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (Washington, DC: 
ALPHA Press, 2009) 27-44, p. 27.
20    Drum, ibid., p. 28.
21    V. Perjul, ‘Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the 
European Union and the United States’, Cornell International Law Journal 44 (2011) 
279-348, p. 290.
22    F. Seatzu, ‘La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui Diritti delle Persone Disabili: i Principi 
Fondamentali’, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 3 (2008) 535-559, p. 535.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/20/2020 04:27:56PM
via Maynooth University
 11Tracing The Boundaries Between Disability And Sickness
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 5-35
In the 1960s, however, scholars and disability activists23 began to heavily 
criticize the ‘medical model’, elaborating a new so-called ‘social model of dis-
ability’. This novel conceptualization of disability was first put forward by the 
Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976,24 but 
the term ‘social model’ was initially used by Mike Oliver in his seminal con-
tribution to the volume The Handicapped Person: A New Perspective for Social 
Workers.25 Without exploring the complex literature on the ‘social model’, it 
suffices to point out that the main feature of such a theory is the conception 
of disability as societal creation.26 In this model, disability is viewed as the 
consequence of environmental barriers. While the impairment is the func-
tional limitation within the individual, disability is ‘the loss or limitation of 
opportunities to take part in the normal life of the community on an equal 
level with others due to physical and social barriers’.27 The medical model 
suggested that disability is the direct consequence of bodily pathology. By 
contrast, the social model affirms that disability is the result of the interac-
tion between impairments and various barriers. Hence, social and economic 
structures create disability and are responsible for the exclusion of people with 
 disabilities.28 The theoretical reflection on the social model is still evolving. 
23    At first, academic interest in disability issues arose during the 1970s in the UK and in 
the USA. In particular, the UK’s first ‘disability studies’ course was taught at the Open 
University (OU) in 1975 as an optional module on the OU’s Health and Social Studies 
Degree. In the USA, disability studies were pioneered by disability advocates and academ-
ics in the area of medical sociology. C. Barnes, ‘The social model of disability: valuable or 
irrelevant?’, in: N. Watson, A. Roulstone, and C. Thomas (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of 
Disability Studies (London: Routledge, 2012) pp. 12-29.
24    The UPIAS statement underlined the nature of disability as a social construction: ‘In 
our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is some-
thing imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and 
excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed 
group in society’. The quotation is reported in D. Anastasiou and J. Kaufmann, ‘The Social 
Model of Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability’, Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 38(2013) 441-459, p. 442. 
25    J. Campling, The Handicapped Person: A New Perspective for Social Workers (London: 
RADAR, 1981).
26    M. Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1996), p. 35.
27    C. Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination (London: Hurst and Co., 1991).
28    C. Barnes and G. Mercer, Exploring Disability, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) 
pp. 29, 35.
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Different  theorisations of the social model itself have been developed,29 but 
a rich and multifaceted critical movement which advocates the inadequacy of 
the social model is also emerging.30
Despite being criticised in more recent years, the social model has undoubt-
edly been the dominant paradigm in understanding disability and has dis-
played an enormous influence in the development of the disability agenda at 
both the national and international levels.31 In this short piece of research we 
are unable to give a full account of national disability law, instead limiting our-
selves to highlight that the expansion of the social model of disability marked 
a new human rights approach at the international level. A cornerstone of this 
expansion was the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD or simply ‘the Convention’), on 13 December 2006.32 It 
is widely recognized that the CRPD is the first binding international instrument 
on disability. It is one of the most ground-breaking pieces of legislation in the 
field of human rights, since it ‘seeks to recast disability as a social construction 
and articulates protections in specific application to their human rights enjoy-
29    There are several ‘social models’ of disability that are variants of the primary social model: 
the legal rights model, the minority group model and the affirmation model of disability. 
There are also a number of models of disability that take elements of the medical and the 
social models and integrate them: two significant examples are the ‘Nagi model’ and the 
‘bio-psycho-social model’ of disability. For an analysis of the different approaches men-
tioned, see among others. Drum, supra note 19, pp. 27-44.
30    Amongst others see Anastasiou and Kaufmann, supra note 24, pp. 441-459; G. Dewsbury, 
K. Clarke, D. Randall, M. Rouncefield and I. Sommerville, ‘The anti‐social model of dis-
ability’, Disability & Society 19(2) (2004) 145-158.
31    As noted by Kayness and French, the primary influence in politics came from the more 
‘populist’ conceptualisation of the social model and from the radical social construction-
ist view of disability, rather than from its contemporary expression as a critical theory 
of disability. See R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light? Introducing the 
Convention of Persons with Disabilities’, Human Rights Law Review (2008) 1-34.
32    The Convention was opened for signature on 30 March 2007 and entered into force on 
3 May 2008, as did its Optional Protocol. The CRPD text, along with its drafting history, 
resolutions, and updated list of signatories and States Parties, is available at http://www 
.un.org/disabilities/. On the Convention, see among others A. Hendricks, ‘UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, European Journal of Health Law 14 (2007) 
273-298; Seatzu, supra note 22, pp. 535-559; S. Marchisio,V. Della Fina, and R. Cera, La 
Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui Diritti delle Persone con Disabilità: Commentario 
(Rome: Aracne, 2010) p. XIII.
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ment’ in line with the ‘social model’.33 The Convention does not create new 
rights for disabled persons; rather, it elaborates and clarifies  existing human 
rights within the disability context,34 taking into account the social model of 
disability. The CRPD does not contain a definition of disability, nor of people 
with disabilities. Article 2, devoted to definitions, does not mention disabil-
ity. This is the result of a compromise among different conflicting positions 
that emerged during the negotiations surrounding the Convention.35 In the 
final text, the idea that disability is a flexible and evolving concept, not suit-
able to be constrained into a strict definition, prevailed. Nonetheless, the CRPD 
provides a sort of open-ended conceptualization in Article 1,36 which affirms 
the purposes of the Convention. Article 1 states that: ‘Persons with disabili-
ties include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’.
This ‘non-definition’ of disability is underpinned by the social model and 
currently provides the minimum grounds for protection to be fulfilled by 
national legislation, and the necessary starting point for any investigation into 
the definition of disability.
33    M.A. Stein and J.E. Lord, ‘Future prospects for the United Nations Convention on 
Disability’, in: G. Quinn and O.M. Arnardottir (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Leiden/Boston: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2009) pp. 33-39. 
34    For a critical discussion see F. Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?’, Human Rights Quarterly, (30)2 (2008) 
494-516; F. Mégret, ‘The disabilities Convention: towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights (2008) 261-278. 
35    During the negotiations of the CRPD, there was disagreement as to whether to include 
or not a definition of disability in the text of the Convention. Some negotiators, such 
as the European Union, suggested not including a precise definition, but prioritizing 
flexibility, adaptation to change and inclusiveness of the concept. Conversely, others, 
especially NGOs, considered that a strict definition was necessary to prevent States from 
evading real commitments. The discussions on the topic took place in particular dur-
ing the Third (24 May-4 June 2004), Fourth (23 August-3 September 2004) and Seventh 
(16 January-3 February 2006) Sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive 
and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, established by the General Assembly resolution 
56/168 of 19 December 2001, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata2bk-
grnd.htm retrieved 14 April 2015.
36    G. Quinn, ‘A short guide to the United Nations Convention on the right of persons with 
disabilities’, European Yearbook of Disability Law 1 (2009) 89-114.
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3 Disability in the EU Legal Framework: Setting the Scene
3.1 The EU Disability Policy in a Nutshell: A Long Journey from the 
Medical to the Social Model
Until the early 1990s, the former European Community’s approach to disabil-
ity was firmly underpinned by the medical model. The earliest policy actions 
aimed to mitigate the social effects of impairments, by carving out separate 
‘parallel social tracks’ for people with disabilities. In other words, European 
actions were directed towards specific measures ‘that provid[ed] income and 
services apart from the institutions that serv[ed] the non-disabled majority’.37 
This led to the creation of a sort of ‘policy of segregation’, which assumed the 
existence of a gap between the social capabilities of persons with disability and 
those of ‘able’ citizens.38 Between 1974 and 1996, the initiatives that were taken 
with regard to disability were primarily non-binding (soft law), or took the 
form of action programmes, providing for exchanges of information.39 In the 
1980s, the end of the first EC action programme and the influence of the United 
Nations disability policy40 provided opportunities to broaden the EC agenda 
beyond the initial and decidedly narrow scope of vocational  integration.41 The 
1986 Recommendation on the Employment of Disabled People in the European 
Community (86/379/EEC) was based on the principle of ‘fair opportunities’ for 
people with disabilities within a European labour market, to be achieved via 
non-discrimination measures.
37    L. Waddington and M. Diller, ‘Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in American, 
European and International Employment Law’, in: M. Breslin and S. Yee (eds.), Disability 
Rights Law and Policy (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002) pp. 241-244.
38    Perjul, supra note 21, p. 290.
39    Initial Community Action Programme for the Vocational Rehabilitation of Handicapped 
Persons (1974-1979), Council Resolution of 24 July 1974, [1974] OJ C 80/30; First 
Community Action Programme on the Social Integration of Handicapped People (1983-
1988), 21 December 1981, [1981] OJ C 347/1; HELIOS I Community Action Programme for 
Disabled People (1988-1991), 23 April 1988, [1988] OJ L 104/38; HELIOS II Community 
Action Programme to assist Disabled People (1993-1996), Council Decision 93/136/EEC of 
25 February 1993, [1993] OJ L 56/30. 
40    See the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, General Assembly reso-
lution n. 2865 of 20 December 1971, the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons n. 
3447 of 9 December 1975, and the International Year of Disabled Persons (1981), General 
Assembly resolution n. 31/123 of 16 December 1976.
41    See for example the European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 1981, [1981] OJ C 77/21.
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As mentioned above, the ‘1996 European Community Disability Strategy’ 
represents a true turning point. The 1996 Strategy shows a clear change of 
direction towards the social model. After the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, in 1999, the disability agenda gained momentum. As a result of an 
extensive campaign by disability NGOs, the Treaty enabled the Community 
institutions to take appropriate actions to combat disability discrimination. 
The enactment of the Employment Equality Directive, which is one of the 
second generation of equality directives, marked the first legislative interven-
tion to promote the rights of people with disabilities. In the same year, the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed. 
Significantly, the Charter contains different provisions related to disability, the 
most important of which are Articles 21 and 26.
In 2003, the Commission adopted a new multi-annual action plan on disabil-
ity running until 2010,42 which was then followed by the European Disability 
Strategy 2010-2020 (the ‘EDS 2010-2020’ or simply the ‘Strategy’).43 The EDS 
2010-2020, adopted in November 2010, enunciates the current policy frame-
work, attempts to mainstream disability in all EU policy fields and ensures 
that people with disabilities enjoy their full rights. While the previous policy 
programmes had (mainly, whilst not exclusively) a strong focus on employ-
ment and accessibility in relation to transportation and built environment, the 
current Strategy adopts a wider approach and is articulated in eight intercon-
nected key areas of action: accessibility, participation, equality, employment, 
education and training, social protection, health and external action. The 
structure and content of the EDS 2010-2020 have been greatly influenced by the 
EU negotiation and accession to the CRPD, which has marked a definite step 
forward in the development of a comprehensive EU disability policy, and in 
the definite abandonment of a pure ‘welfare’ approach. Indeed, the CRPD itself 
has become integral part of EU law,44 and due to its sub-constitutional status,45 
now represents the benchmark of the current EU disability policy.
3.2 Disability as a Ground on Which Discrimination Is Prohibited
In the EU constitutional framework the principle of non-discrimination and 
equality is firmly embedded in the Treaties. Article 2 TEU, which states the 
42    Commission Communication of 30 October 2003, Equal opportunities for people with dis-
abilities: a European Action Plan, COM (2003) 650 final. 
43    Commission Communication of 15 November 2010, European Disability Strategy 2010-
2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, SEC (2010) 1324 final.
44    Ex multis, Case C-239/03 Etang de Berre [2004] ECR I-07357, para 25. See infra Section 6.
45    See infra Section 5.
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values upon which the Union is founded, includes inter alia, the principle of 
equality. It also affirms that ‘[t]hese values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidar-
ity and equality between women and men prevail’. Article 3 TEU states that the 
EU ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination’. Article 9 TEU mandates 
the EU institutions to afford all citizens equal attention, and Article 21 TEU 
sets forth the requirement that the EU be guided by the principle of equality 
in EU external action. Although these articles do not create any legal rights, 
their prominent position in the TEU shows that the EU is committed to ensur-
ing at least equality of opportunity at the present time, and allows for a more 
substantive form of protection to develop in the future.46 The TFEU contains 
a horizontal clause on non-discrimination in Article 10 TFEU,47 and provides 
the EU with a legal basis for the EU non-discrimination legislation. Article 19 
TFEU (former Article 13 EC) allows the EU to take action to combat discrimi-
nation on the named grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. Furthermore, Article 20 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides for equality before the 
law, while Article 21(1) provides for an all-embracing prohibition on discrimi-
nation. Article 21 further states that:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or 
any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
Article 26 of the Charter is also worth citing.48 This provision states that 
‘[t]he Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to 
46    E. Howard, ‘EU Equality Law: Three Recent Developments’, European Law Journal, 17 
(2011) 785-803; E. Ellis and P. Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford: University 
Press, 2012).
47    Article 10 TFEU reads as follows: ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and activi-
ties, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’.
48    V. Bongiovanni, ‘La tutela dei disabili tra Carta di Nizza e Convenzione delle Nazioni 
Unite’, Famiglia e Diritto, 3(2011) 310-320, also available online: http://www.iusme.it/
contributi/04%20-%20Veronica%20Bongiovanni.pdf, retrived 14 April 2015, M. Olivetti, 
‘Uguaglianza. Art. 26 Inserimento dei disabili’, in: R. Bifulco, M. Cartabia, A. Celotto (eds.), 
L’Europa dei diritti. Commentario alla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001) pp. 202-209; C. Hanau, ‘Handicap’, in: Digesto delle Discipline 
Pubblicistiche, VIII (Turin: Utet, 2003) p. 67.
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benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and 
occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’.49 
These measures (i.e. measures to which Article 26 refers) may concern 
 education, vocational training, ergonomics, accessibility, mobility, means 
of transport and housing (point 26 of the Community Charter on the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989),50 as well as access to cultural 
and leisure activities.51
Having regard to secondary legislation, former Article 13 EC (i.e., Article 19 
TFEU) has been the legal basis for a second generation of equality directives 
(the so-called ‘Article 13 Directives’), which build upon the experience gained 
in the legislation to combat gender and other forms of discrimination at the EU 
level.52 Among the non-discrimination instruments, the most relevant in this 
context and for the purpose of the subsequent analysis, is the already men-
tioned Employment Equality Directive. As provided for in Article 1, the pur-
pose of this Directive is
to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in 
the Member States the principle of equal treatment.
49    The text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is available online, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf, retrieved 14 April 2015. 
50    The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers establishes the 
major principles on which the European labour law model is based and, more generally, 
addresses the role of work in society. On 9 December 1989, the Member States, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom, adopted a declaration constituting the Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Since 1985, increasing concern had 
been expressed at all levels with the social consequences of the creation of the Single 
European Market, and there was a perceived need for the formulation and implementa-
tion of a comprehensive social dimension for the 1992 programme. 
51    Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern of 22 May 2014, not yet published.
52    These Directives include: Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a gen-
eral framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L 303/16; 
Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L 180/22; Council 
Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services of 13 December 2004, [2004] 
OJ L 373; Directive 2006/54/EC of the EP and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the imple-
mentation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), [2006] OJ L 204/23.
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There is a huge amount of literature on the Employment Equality Directive 
and several CJEU decisions have shaped the meaning and the scope of its 
 provisions. For the purpose of this analysis, it suffices to point out that this 
directive bans both direct discrimination (differential treatment based on a 
specific characteristic) and indirect discrimination (any provision, criterion 
or practice which is apparently neutral, but is liable to adversely affect one 
or more specific individuals or incite discrimination). Settled CJEU case law 
states that the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situ-
ations must not be treated differently, that dissimilar situations must not be 
treated in the same way, and a different treatment may be justified if it is based 
on objective considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate objective 
being pursued.53 Harassment, which creates a hostile environment, is also 
deemed to be a form of discrimination.54
The Employment Equality Directive requires Member States to provide 
for effective judicial remedies, bestow representative associations with locus 
standi to bring actions on behalf of individuals, embed legal rules on shifting 
the burden of proof to the respondent where a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation is established, and provide for sanctions. Notably, the Employment 
Equality Directive imposes only minimum requirements, and allows Member 
States to apply provisions which are more favourable to the protection of equal 
treatment than those laid down in the Directive.
The Employment Equality Directive has had a significant impact on the 
level of protection provided to victims of disability discrimination in the EU 
Member States. Nonetheless, several aspects of the directive remain unclear. 
The question of discrimination by association, i.e. whether the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of disability should include situations where a 
person is subjected to disadvantage because of their association with some-
body who has a disability, was addressed by the CJEU in Coleman v. Attridge 
Law.55 Nonetheless, whether discrimination on the basis of perceived disabil-
ity (discrimination because a person is erroneously perceived to have a dis-
ability) falls within the ambit of discrimination on the basis of disability which 
53    Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v. Etat Belge [2003] ECR I-11613.
54    Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Employment Equality Directive specifies that ‘harassment 
shall be deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of paragraph 1, when 
unwanted conduct related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 takes place with 
the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’. 
55    Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603. The European 
judges held that the Directive should be interpreted to require the prohibition of associa-
tive discrimination of this type, at least in relation to direct discrimination or harassment. 
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Member States must prohibit is still unclear.56 In addition, the scope of the 
Directive is strictly limited to employment-related issues, as confirmed by the 
most recent CJEU case-law.57
The European Commission has long been concerned to address the pitfalls 
of the Directive and to extend the EU’s non-discrimination legislation beyond 
the sphere of employment and occupation, addressing discrimination in the 
fields of social protection, social advantages, education, and access to and sup-
ply of public goods and services. With this in mind, in 2008, the Commission 
presented a Proposal for a New Equal Treatment Directive.58 Without address-
ing this proposal in detail, it suffices to point out that, in addition to cover-
ing sectors other than employment, this proposed Directive would introduce 
a number of additional provisions to strengthen disability discrimination law, 
including guidance on the meaning of ‘disability’ in the same terms as Article 1 
of the CRPD, thus addressing the absence of a prescriptive definition. However, 
this proposed Directive is still subject to an ongoing discussion and negoti-
ation in Council. As yet, it has not been possible to achieve the unanimous 
agreement of all Member States that is required for the adoption of directives 
based on Article 19 TFEU, meaning the directive is far from being approved.59
4 Disability v. Sickness in the EU: From Discrimination to Prevention 
and Safety
Before examining the CJEU case law and in order to clarify the legal framework 
behind the Court’s reasoning, it seems appropriate to sketch out the context 
in which the notion of sickness has emerged and is currently “regulated”. We 
56    D. Ferri and A. De Paor, ‘Regulating Genetic Discrimination in the European Union: 
Pushing the EU into Unchartered Territory or Ushering in a New Genomic Era?’, European 
Journal of Law Reform 17(1) (2015).
57    Case C-363/12 Z. v. A Government Department and The Board of management of a commu-
nity school of 18 March 2014, not yet published. 
58    Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, 
COM (2008) 426 def.
59    For a detailed report of Proposal’s procedure see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
en/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52008PC0426, retrieved 14 April 2015. See also ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespec-
tive of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (2008)’, The European Union, 
Annual Review of European Law and Policy, European Yearbook of Disability Law (2015) 
173-175; M. Bell, ‘Advancing EU Anti-Discrimination Law: the European Commission’s 
2008 Proposal for a New Directive’, The Equal Rights Review, 3(2009) 7-18.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/20/2020 04:27:56PM
via Maynooth University
20 Favalli and Ferri
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 5-35
will not provide a detailed analysis of EU health and safety at work legislation,60 
which has already been exhaustively documented by several commentators.61 
Nor will we discuss social security coordination.62 Rather we will try to high-
light how the concept of sickness has emerged in the EU but in a discreet way.
First, this can be seen in how sickness has been regulated by the EU mainly 
in the context of its health and safety at work legislation, which has emerged 
since the beginning of the creation of the Internal Market.63 Currently, 
Article 153(1) TFEU provides the legal basis for legislative acts on occupational 
health and safety, stating that the Union shall support and complement the 
activities of the Member States in the ‘improvement in particular of the work-
ing environment to protect workers’ health and safety’. While this provision 
is oriented towards the protection of workers from risks to their health, i.e., 
to prevention, it does not deal with the consequences that flow when those 
risks materialize. The EU has mainly a supporting competence, and does not 
(and arguably cannot) regulate how illness at work (absence due to sickness) 
must be managed (as this would likely engage with or necessitate social secu-
rity coordination). Sickness is not mentioned in the Treaties as a ground of 
discrimination. Likewise, Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, which provides that ‘every worker has the right to work-
ing conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity’, does not 
confer additional power upon the EU in this context. In line with this consti-
tutional framework, the most significant piece of secondary legislation in the 
field of occupational health and safety is the 1989 Framework Directive on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health 
60    With Council Regulation 2062/94/EC of 18 July 1994 establishing a European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work, [1994] OJ L 216/1, the European Union established a decentral-
ised agency, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) with the task 
of collecting, analyzing and disseminating relevant information that can serve the needs 
of people involved in safety and health at work. Further information available online at 
https://osha.europa.eu/en, retrieved 14 April 2015.
61    Ex pluribus G. Guerra, ‘La strategia europea in materia di sanità: esame del programma 
pluriennale di azione per la salute 2014-2020’, Politiche sanitarie 15(4) (2014) 212-215.
62    S.L. Greer and T. Sokol, ‘Rules for Rights: European Law, Health Care and Social Citizenship’, 
European Law Journal 20(1) (2014) 66-87. 
63    Further to the evolution of the EU policies on health and safety at work, see B. Valdès de la 
Vega, ‘Occupational health and safety: An EU perspective’, in: E. Ales, Health and Safety at 
Work. European Comparative Perspective (Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2013) pp. 1-27.
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of workers at work.64 This 1989 Framework Directive is based on the ‘principle 
of absolute prevention’, and aims to eliminate the risk factors for occupational 
diseases and accidents. It obliges employers to establish means and measures 
for protecting workers, but does not cover those situations in which the worker 
experiences/suffers from a health condition. It focuses instead on activities of 
prevention, information and the training of workers, to avoid risks or manage 
those risks that cannot be avoided. Beside this Framework Directive, the EU 
has adopted multiple technical and sector-specific directives, which lay down 
more rigorous or specific provisions. In this respect, it would appear that EU 
law is primarily focused on preventing occupational causes of ill-health, while 
not addressing the right to sick leave and the conditions for exercising that 
right through the substantive reallocation of financial resources.65
The concept of sickness also features within EU legislation on social security 
coordination: Regulation (EC) No 883/200466 as implemented by the Imple-
menting Regulation (EC) No 987/2009.67 This regulation coordinates social 
security systems of the Member States, and establishes a framework for the 
exportability of social security benefits relating to sickness, maternity, invalid-
ity, old age, accidents at work, occupational disease, unemployment, survivors’ 
benefits, death grants and family benefits, but does not apply to medical or 
social assistance. In this context however, EU legislation focuses on the ben-
efit itself, rather than on the purpose of that benefit. In addition, a distinction 
has been made between sickness benefits, explicitly mentioned in the regula-
tion, and ‘disability-related’ benefits, not addressed expressis verbis. The lat-
ter, as extensively discussed by Lisa Waddington, where they amount to social 
assistance benefits, ‘fall outside the scope of the regulations and cannot, for 
example, be exported under EU law’.68
64    Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, [1989] OJ L 183/1. 
65    Joined Cases C-350/06 Schultz-Hoff v. Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund and C-520/06 
Stringer v. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2010] ECR I-179.
66    Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coor-
dination of social security, [2004] OJ L 166/1.
67    Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, [2009] OJ L 284/42.
68    L. Waddington, ‘Disability Benefits and Entitlements in European Countries: Mutual 
Recognition and Exportability of Benefits: A synthesis of evidence provided by ANED 
country reports and additional sources’, University of Leeds and European Human 
Consultancy: Academic Network of European Disability experts — ANED, December 
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It appears from this very succinct overview that EU health law has adopted 
a narrow approach, focused on the prevention and minimisation of risk that 
might lead to sickness or injury rather than the allocation of resources if that 
event takes place. The subsequent absence of an EU non-discrimination pol-
icy on the ground of sickness has resulted in disparities across Member States 
in the levels of protections provided between apparently similar situations, 
depending on the qualification of the individual condition as disability or 
as mere illness. Having regards to social security legislation, Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 aims mainly to coordinate Member States’ actions, and envisages 
the portability (though with limitations) of sickness benefits. However, this 
specific piece of legislation does not address social assistance benefits, mean-
ing that disability-related benefits which amount to social assistance benefits 
fall outside the scope of the regulations and cannot, for example, be exported 
under EU law.
5 The Early CJEU Case Law: The Medical Model Approach
Since the 1990s the EU institutions have recognised the need to base policy 
on the social model of disability.69 Notwithstanding this approach, in its first 
attempt to define disability in Chacon Navas,70 the CJEU counterintuitively 
embraced the outdated and maligned medical model and its definition of 
what constitutes a disability.
In this case the claimant, a Spanish employee who had been off work sick 
for eight months, was dismissed. While the employer acknowledged that the 
dismissal was ‘unlawful’ under Spanish law and offered her compensation, the 
employee argued that the dismissal was ‘void’ due to the unequal treatment 
and discrimination she suffered. She claimed that she should be reinstated in 
her post, returning her to the position she was in before the dismissal took 
place. Although under Spanish law this type of dismissal should have been 
plainly conceived as unlawful rather than void (because in Spanish law sick-
ness is not expressly referred to as a prohibited ground of discrimination), the 
Spanish court decided to stay the proceeding and requested a preliminary 
 ruling from the CJEU.
2010, http://www.disability-europe.net/theme/disability-benefits/reports-benefits-enti 
tlements, retrieved 14 April 2015.
69    See supra Section 3.
70    Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-6467.
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The national court argued that there was a causal link between the concept 
of sickness and that of disability, and argued that sickness is capable of caus-
ing ‘defects which disable individuals’. The Spanish judges referred to the defi-
nition of disability issued by the International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICF),71 and, on the basis of the ICF definition, asserted 
that ‘disability’ is a generic term that includes defects, limitation of activity and 
restriction of participation in social life’.72 The referring court took the view
that workers must be protected in a timely manner under the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of disability. Otherwise, the protection 
intended by the legislature would, in large measure, be nullified, because 
it would thus be possible to implement uncontrolled discriminatory 
practices.
The Spanish Court acknowledged that, under EU law, disability and sickness 
are two separate concepts. It also acknowledged that EU law does not apply 
directly to sickness. However, it asked whether the Employment Equality 
Directive might include within its protective scope a worker who has been dis-
missed by her employer solely because she is sick, or whether sickness might 
constitute ‘an identifying attribute’, that ‘should be added to the ones in rela-
tion to which Directive 2000/78/EC prohibits discrimination’.73
In order to reply to the questions referred, the Court attempted to interpret 
the concept of disability and its applicability to the plaintiff ’s case. In render-
ing its judgment, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of disability, based 
71    World Health Organisation, ICIDH 2. International Classification of Impairments, Disabili-
ties and Handicaps, Final Draft (Geneva: WHO, 2001). The World Health Organization has 
elaborated a series of international classifications on health (the so called WHO  Family of 
International Classifications) with the purpose of providing a consensual framework and 
a common language for governments, providers and consumers in the field. Among these 
classifications, the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) 
establishes a standard language and conceptual basis for the definition and measurement 
of disability. The ICF recognizes the role of both environmental factors and health condi-
tions in the creation of disability. It is therefore based on the ‘bio-psycho-social’ model of 
disability, which integrates the two major models of disability, the medical and the social 
model. Definitions and categories in the ICF are worded in neutral language: disability 
and functioning are understood as ‘umbrella terms’ denoting the positive and negative 
aspects of functioning from a biological, individual and social perspective.
72    Para. 22, C-13/05, supra note 70.
73    Paras. 21-25, C-13/05, ibid.
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on the medical model,74 and consequently clearly distinguished the concept 
of sickness from that of disability:75 ‘the concept of ‘disability’ must be under-
stood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, 
mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of 
the person concerned in professional life’.76
As noted by Waddington, according to the CJEU the cause of the disad-
vantage is the individual ‘impairment’, irrespective of the role played by envi-
ronmental barriers. Furthermore, differentiating the facts of the case from 
Mangold,77 the Court gave a similarly very narrow interpretation of the scope 
of the Directive.78 It clarified that, although fundamental rights, which form 
an integral part of the general principles of EU law, include a general principle 
of non-discrimination, ‘it does not follow from this that the scope of Directive 
2000/78 should be extended by analogy beyond the discrimination based on 
the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof.’79
The Court followed the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Geelhoeld, who 
provided a lengthy and detailed interpretation of former Article 13 EC (i.e., 
Article 19 TFEU) in connection with the Employment Equality Directive. The 
AG, referring to the evolution and wording of former Article 13 EC, mentioned 
that the list of prohibited grounds for discrimination is exhaustive and the 
scope of the directive needs to be interpreted strictly. According to the AG, 
the Court is bound to respect the choices made by the EU legislature ‘with 
regard to the definition of the prohibition of discrimination and the substan-
tive and personal delineation of that prohibition and must not stretch them’. 
In line with this reasoning, the Court reaffirmed that the wording of both 
the Treaty and the directive demonstrated that the EU legislators, by select-
ing the word ‘disability’, must be taken to have intended that ‘sickness’ has a 
different  meaning.80 Ultimately, the Court argued that there is nothing in the 
Employment Equality Directive to suggest that workers who develop any type 
74    L. Waddington, ‘Equal to the Task? Re-Examining EU Equality Law in Light of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, European Yearbook of 
Disability Law 4(2013) 169-200.
75    L. Waddington, ‘Case C-13/05, Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006’, Common Market Law Review 44(2) (2007) 487-499.
76    Para. 43 C-13/05, supra note 70.
77    Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, SA [2005] ECR I-9981.
78    F. Evangelista, ‘Malattia e handicap, distinte le tutele Ue’, Diritto e giustizia, 34 (2006) 
100-101; G. Giappichelli, ‘La Corte di Giustizia si pronuncia sulla nozione di handicap: un 
freno alla vis espansiva del diritto antidiscriminatorio?’, Riv. it. dir. lav. 4 (2007) 758-775.
79    Para. 56, Case C-13/05, C-13/05, supra note 70.
80    Para. 44, ibid.
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of sickness will fall within the purview of the protections granted to those dis-
criminated against based on a personal disability.
In Chacon Navas, the Court established an uncomfortable and potentially 
dangerous precedent. Not only does it see the Court embrace the medical 
model, but the Court makes no distinction between long-term or chronic dis-
eases and short-term illnesses.81 In the reasoning of the Court, a temporary 
disability (as defined by the Court itself) seems to fall within the scope of the 
directive, whilst long term sicknesses fall clearly outside it, but this divide 
marks a blurred line between protection from and vulnerability to adverse 
treatment.82 As noted by Waddington,83 the Court was formally correct in stat-
ing that sickness, illness and chronic illness are not explicitly mentioned either 
in the directive or in Article 19 TFEU. However, we submit that this formalistic 
approach creates a misleading ambiguity given the fact that the Court failed to 
explain the existence of any such distinction between sickness and disability.
According to Flynn and Quinn, the formal legal arguments employed by the 
Court obscure other objectives that it has pursued in its judgment. They sug-
gest that the Court opted for a definition of disability that inflicts the lowest 
financial burden on Member States in giving effect to that same definition. 
This view is revealing, and most likely ‘the issue of costs (and the need not to 
unduly intrude on the prerogatives of member States) played a role in deter-
mining the boundaries of the definition of disability’.84
Subsequently, in Coleman,85 the Court did not confront either the prece-
dent established in Chacon Navas or the normative definition of disability. It 
instead substantially broadened the scope ratione personae addressed within 
the Directive, disregarding the formalistic approach the Court uses in inter-
preting the grounds.86
81    D. Hosking, ‘European Developments. A High Bar for EU Disability Rights. Case C-13/05, 
Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA’, Industrial Law Journal 36(2) (2007) 228-237.
82    A.M. Lawson, L. Waddington, European Network of Legal Experts in the non- discrimination 
field, Disability and Non-discrimination Law in the European Union. An Analysis of Disability 
Discrimination Law within and beyond the Employment Field (Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2009).
83    Waddington, supra note 75, pp. 487-499.
84    G. Quinn and E. Flynn, ‘Transatlantic Borrowings: The Past and Future of EU Non dis-
crimination Law and Policy on the Ground of Disability’, American Journal of Comparative 
Law 60(2012) 23-48.
85    Case C-303/06, supra note 55.
86    L. Waddington, ‘Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, Judgment of 
the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 17 July 2008’, Common Market Law Review 
46(2) (2009) 665-681. With reference to the implications of Coleman on the topic of 
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In Coleman, the reference to the CJEU was made in the course of proceed-
ings between Ms Coleman, and Attridge Law, a firm of solicitors. Ms. Coleman 
claimed she had been dismissed from her employment and treated less favour-
ably than her fellow employees due to her ancillary role as a primary care-giver 
for her disabled son in her private life. The referring court asked, in essence, 
whether the Employment Equality Directive must be interpreted as prohibit-
ing direct, first order discrimination on grounds of disability in respect of an 
employee who is himself disabled, or whether the principle of equal treatment 
and the prohibition of direct discrimination applies to second order discrimi-
nation. Second order discrimination arises where an employee is not himself 
disabled but is treated less favourably by reason of the disability of his child, 
for whom he or she is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the 
child’s condition, as in Coleman.
Following AG Poiares Maduro’s Opinion,87 the CJEU noted that
the scope of Directive 2000/78 cannot be extended beyond the discrimi-
nation based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the direc-
tive, with the result that a person who has been dismissed by his employer 
solely on account of sickness cannot fall within the scope of the general 
framework established by Directive 2000/78.88
The Court again recalled the Chacon Navas verdict’s strict definition of 
 disability.89 Nevertheless, the European judges did not hold that the princi-
ple of equal treatment and the scope ratione personae of that directive must 
 discrimination of association in EU, see C. Karagiorgi, ‘The Concept of Discrimination by 
Association and its Application in the EU Member States’, European Anti-discrimination 
Law Review (2014) 25-37; D. Venturi, ‘Effettività della Tutela Comunitaria contro la 
Discriminazione Diretta Fondata sull’Handicap ed Estensione dell’Ambito Soggettivo 
della Tutela: il Caso Coleman’, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 3(2008) 849-854.
87    In his Opinion of 31 January 2008, Advocate General Maduro highlighted that the 
Directive was adopted under former Article 13 EC and must be interpreted in light of the 
objectives of that Article. He referred to equality, human dignity and personal autonomy 
as underlying values. He stated that directly targeting someone who is disabled is one way 
of discriminating against him, but it is not the only way. He noted that ‘the person who 
is the immediate victim of discrimination not only experiences a wrong himself, but also 
becomes the means through which the dignity of the person belonging to a suspect classi-
fication is undermined.’ He stated that a ‘robust conception of equality entails that these 
subtler forms of discrimination should also be caught by anti-discrimination legislation’.
88    Case C-303/06, para. 46, supra note 55.
89    Ibid., paras. 45 and 46.
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be interpreted strictly with regard to those grounds, and recognised that dis-
crimination by association or second order discrimination is covered by the 
directive.
Despite the criticism, the narrow, medical model-oriented concept of dis-
ability elaborated in Chacon Navas remained intact in the EU system. This was 
to be altered, however, with the ratification of the CRPD, which was completed 
on 23 December 2010.
6 A New Perspective: The Impact of the Ratification of the CRPD on 
the EU Definition of Disability
After the ratification of the CRPD, the CJEU abandoned the outdated medical 
model and overruled Chacon Navas. In a series of seminal rulings concerning 
the Employment Equality Directive, the Court firmly embraced a wide-ranging 
definition of disability, in line with Article 1 CRPD and reflective of the social 
model of disability.
The Court based its decision to deviate from Chacon Navas on the principle 
of consistent interpretation governing the relationship between international 
treaty law and EU law. In this respect, it is well known that Article 216(2) TFEU 
(former Article 300(7) EC) simply stipulates that international agreements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions and its Member 
States. In interpreting this provision, the CJEU has played a vital role in elabo-
rating on the legal consequences of the EU’s accession to international treaties. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, international treaties were considered to form 
‘an integral part of Community law’90 once they entered into force. As Wessel 
states, the notion that international law forms an integral part of EU law seems 
to be upheld by recent cases such as Intertanko and Kadi,91 even if these cases 
equally make clear that it is EU law itself that sets the conditions for the valid-
ity of international norms within its legal order.92 The status of international 
90    Case C-181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, [1974] ECR 449. In this decision, the Court 
used the notion of incorporation, according to which provisions of international agree-
ments are not transposed and do not need further validation. They become part of the EU 
legal order after the conclusion of the agreement, simply by entering into force.
91    Joined cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
[2008] ECR I-6351.
92    R. Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the Relationship between International and EU Law: Towards 
a Content-Based Approach?’, in: E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti, and R.A. Wessel (eds.), 
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agreements within the hierarchy of sources of law was also considered by the 
CJEU. The Court has argued that international treaties are situated formally 
below the provisions of the Treaties.93 It derives that, in hierarchical terms, 
the CRPD is inferior to the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (and the Treaty on European Union), but superior to second-
ary EU law. The latter point implies that provisions of EU secondary law must, 
as far as practicable, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those 
agreements.94 Namely, the Employment Equality Directive must now be inter-
preted in light of the CRPD.
The first case in which the Court explicitly referred to the CRPD was Ring 
and Werge.95 Ms Jette Ring and Ms Lone Skouboe Werge were both dismissed 
after several absences from work caused by their health conditions. The 
trade union HK, acting on behalf of the two applicants, submitted that both 
employees were suffering from a disability. It claimed that their employers 
were required to offer them reduced working hours, by virtue of the obliga-
tion to provide accommodation pursuant to Article 5 of Employment Equality 
Directive. In both main proceedings the employers disputed the contention 
that the applicants’ state of health was covered by the concept of ‘disability’ 
within the meaning of the directive. The referring courts thus asked the CJEU 
if and when a condition caused by a medically diagnosed illness could be 
covered by the ground of disability. The CJEU was thus called to resolve the 
uncertainty created by the Chacón Navas case about the borderline difference 
between disability and sickness.
In its decision, the Court articulated that the Employment Equality Directive 
must, as far as practicable, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
CRPD. It subsequently emphasised a social model-oriented definition of dis-
ability consistent with the Convention. It considered in particular the wording 
International Law as Law of the European Union (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2011) pp. 7-35. 
93    In particular, as regards mixed agreements, the Court has also stated that they ‘have the 
same status of purely Community agreements, in so far as the provisions fall within the 
scope of Community competence’.
94    Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, [52]. F. Casolari, ‘Giving Indirect 
Effect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: The Doctrine of Consistent 
Interpretation’, in: Cannizzaro et al. (eds.), supra note 92, pp. 395-415.
95    Joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk 
Almennyttigt Boligselskab (C-335/11) and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe 
Werge v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, in liquidation 
(C-337/11) of 11 April 2013, not yet published.
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of Recital (e)96 and Article 1, paragraph 297 of the Convention, which recog-
nises that ‘sickness can, in some circumstances, constitute a disability’ for the 
purpose of the directive:
if a curable or incurable illness entails a limitation which results in par-
ticular from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in 
interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective partici-
pation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with 
other workers, and the limitation is a long-term one, such an illness can 
be covered by the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 
2000/78.98
The Court distinguished between short-term illnesses, which are not to be 
regarded as a disability, and long-term impairments which can be caused by 
sickness and which, when subject to various barriers and exogenous factors, 
can be regarded as disabilities.99
Furthermore, the CJEU has adopted an ‘aetiology-neutral’ concept of disabil-
ity, in line with the WHO classifications.100 This means that the Employment 
Equality Directive ‘is not intended to cover only disabilities that are congeni-
tal or result from accidents, to the exclusion of those caused by illness’.101 The 
Court, on the basis of the ICF and the CRPD, does not draw any explicit or 
implicit distinction between different health conditions, shifting the focus 
from the health condition to the functionality of the individual, and to the dis-
ability resulting from the interaction with external barriers.
In Ring and Werge, the CJEU openly distanced itself from the position it 
took in Chacon Navas and interpreted the definition of disability in light of 
96    CRPD, Preamble, Recital (e): ‘Disability is an evolving concept and that disability results 
from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environ-
mental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others’.
97    Article 1(2) CRPD is reported in the introduction.
98    Joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11, para. 41, supra note 95.
99    L. Waddington, ‘HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge): Interpreting EU Equality 
Law of the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities’, European Anti-
discrimination Law Review (2013) 11-23, p. 21.
100    World Health Organization, How to Use the ICF: A Practical Manual for Using the Interna-
tional Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Exposure Draft for Com-
ment (Geneva: WHO, 2013).
101    Joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11, para. 40, supra note 95.
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the CRPD.102 Subsequently, the CJEU has had several opportunities to refine 
both the definitions of disability and the effects of the CRPD on EU law.103 In 
Commission v Italy104 the CJEU confirmed that, while it is true that the concept 
of ‘disability’ is not directly defined in the Employment Equality Directive, 
it should be interpreted in light of the CRPD. Similarly, in Z. v. A Government 
Department and the Board of management of a community school, the Court 
referred to Article 1 CRPD and again firmly embraced the social model of dis-
ability. This case concerned surrogacy, and the Court discussed whether and 
how this practice might be covered by the current legal framework on mater-
nity leave. In particular, the CJEU was confronted with the question of whether 
a mother who did not give birth to her own child, born via a surrogate, has a 
right to maternity leave under EU law. In this context, the CJEU clarified that, 
even though infertility could be categorized as a disability under the CRPD, the 
Employment Equality Directive does not apply to women unable to become or 
carry out a pregnancy. The Court relied on the limited scope of the directive 
ratione materiae, as the directive only targets disabilities that make a worker’s 
involvement in professional life more burdensome, which is not the case for 
medical conditions that prevent women from getting pregnant. Namely the 
Court stated that ‘the inability to have a child by conventional means does not 
in itself, in principle, prevent the commissioning mother from having access 
to, participating in or advancing in employment’. Again, in Glatzel,105 the 
Court recalled its own case law and held that the definition of ‘disability’ must 
be understood ‘as long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments 
102    Venchiarutti, supra note 18, p. 416. 
103    In C-363/12 Z. v. A Government, paras. 84-90, supra note 57, and in C-356/12 Glatzel, 
paras. 68-69, supra note 51, the Court pointed out that in so far as the obligations imposed 
by that Convention are addressed to Contracting Parties, that international agreement 
is ‘programmatic’. Consequently, since the provisions of the CRPD are subject, in their 
implementation or effects, to the adoption of subsequent measures which are the respon-
sibility of the Contracting Parties, they therefore do not have direct effect in European 
Union law. It follows that the validity of Directive 2000/78 cannot be assessed in the light 
of the UN Convention, but that directive must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a man-
ner that is consistent with that Convention. 
104    Case C-312/11 Commission v. Italy of 4 July 2013, not yet published. The case originated 
from an action for failure to fulfil EU obligations brought by the Commission against Italy. 
The Commission affirmed that Italy did not correctly transpose Directive 2000/78 into 
its national law, and, in particular, it did not ensure, in breach of the Directive, that rea-
sonable accommodation in the workplace is to apply to all persons with disabilities, all 
employers, and all aspects of the employment relationship.
105    Case C-356/12, supra note 51.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/20/2020 04:27:56PM
via Maynooth University
 31Tracing The Boundaries Between Disability And Sickness
european Journal of health law 23 (2016) 5-35
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective 
participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis 
with other workers’, although, then, the Court stated that it did not have suf-
ficient information to ascertain whether Mr. Glatzel’s impairment constituted 
a ‘disability’.
It is, however, only in Kaltoft106 that the Court addressed again the relation-
ship between disability and sickness. The facts concerned the dismissal of 
Mr. Karsten Kaltoft, who worked for 15 years for the Municipality of Billund 
(Denmark) as a childminder. During his employment, consequent to his rec-
ognised obesity, Kaltoft was provided financial assistance to fund fitness and 
physical training sessions as part of the local authority’s health policy, but 
without successful results. Although the employer disputed that Mr. Kaltoft’s 
obesity formed part of the reasons behind his dismissal, the Fag og Arbejde, a 
workers’ union acting on behalf of Mr. Kaltoft, brought proceedings founded 
upon unlawful discrimination on grounds of disability. The claimant argued in 
his written observations that the WHO considers obesity to be a chronic and 
durable illness.107 Furthermore, he pointed out that obesity has been consid-
ered to be a disability under the law of the United States of America. Obesity 
can, in fact, entail physical limitations that create obstacles to the full and 
effective participation in professional life, either because of reduced mobility 
or because of pathologies or symptoms that result from it, and it can equally 
entail limitations on the employment market by reason of prejudice on the 
basis of physical appearance.108 In these circumstances, the referring court 
asked the CJEU if obesity could be deemed to be a disability within the mean-
ing of the Employment Equality Directive.109
106    Case C-354/13 Fag og Arbejde (FOA), acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft, v. Kommunernes 
Landsforening (KL), acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund of 18 December 2014, 
not yet published.
107    The WHO ranks obesity into three classes by reference to the BMI. Persons with a BMI of 
30.00 to 34.99 are Obese class I, persons with a BMI of 35.00 to 39.99 are Obese class II, and 
persons with a BMI in excess of 40.00 are Obese class III, which is sometimes referred to 
as severe, extreme or morbid obesity.
108    Case C-354/13, para. 52, supra note 106.
109    Although it is not relevant for the purpose of this article, it is worth highlighting that by 
its first question, the referring court essentially asked whether EU law must be interpreted 
as laying down a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of obesity as such 
as regards employment and occupation. After a brief analysis of the EU law and case law 
(with reference in particular to Chacon Navas) on the topic (paras. 31-40), the Court finally 
opted out for a negative solution. 
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Both the Opinion of the AG and the judgment of the Court recognized that, 
even if obesity does not in itself constitute a disability within the meaning of 
Directive 2000/78/EC, nonetheless
in the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of the worker 
concerned entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, 
mental or psychological impairments that in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of that person in 
professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and the limitation 
is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of ‘disability’ 
within the meaning of Directive 2000/78.110
The CJEU did not deal with this issue directly, other than to provide these crite-
ria. Instead, it returned the matter to the national court to determine whether, 
in the main proceedings, the above conditions are met.111
The Court’s judgment illustrates a perfect juxtaposition between the con-
cepts of illness and of obesity and, because of this, the Court was able to recall 
the conclusions of Ring and Werge. Notably the Court distanced itself some-
what from AG Jääskinen’s opinion, blurring the distinction between sickness 
and disability. First, the AG explicitly compared obesity to an illness, recall-
ing the WHO classification. Conversely, the Court in referring to obesity never 
used the words illness or sickness, even if the comparison between illness and 
obesity rests in the background. The Court seemed to move much more cau-
tiously in defining obesity, merely stating that it entails a general ‘limitation’ to 
exercising an activity. In addition, the AG succumbed to the temptation to par-
tially adopt a medical approach, proposing that only severe obesity (according 
to the WHO classification) could amount to a disability and so fall within the 
purview of the Employment Equality Directive, provided that all the requi-
sites set out in Ring and Werge are met. By contrast, the final judgment did 
not mention any distinction between obesity ‘classes’, leaving to the national 
courts (and legislation) such distinction. The Court therefore demonstrates a 
110    Case C-354/13, para. 59, supra note 106.
111    For a critical comment on the possible consequences of Kaltoft in EU disability discrimi-
nation law see I. Solanke, ‘Kaltoft — a step (in the wrong direction?) towards protection 
from weight discrimination under EU law’, Eutopia law 2014, 22 December 2014, http://
eutopialaw.com/2014/12/22/kaltoft-a-step-in-the-wrong-direction-towards-protection-
from-weight-discrimination-under-eu-law/, retrieved 14 April 2015. 
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particular reticence in addressing such a topical issue,112 acknowledging that 
the implications of recognising obesity as a disability could have a large impact 
on the labour market and, recalling Flynn and Quinn’s arguments, on the costs 
to be borne by the Member States, especially those where obesity is an increas-
ing phenomenon.113
Lastly, although the EU has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol 
to the CRPD, it might be argued that the CJEU was deeply influenced by the 
jurisprudence of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, 
which provides an authentic interpretation of the Convention. Just one month 
before Kaltoft, the Committee had the chance to offer its own interpreta-
tion of the concept of disability contrasting it to that of sickness in Ms. S.C. 
v Brazil.114 The Committee specified that the (non) definition of disability in 
Article 1 CRPD is not to be interpreted strictly, but could potentially cover a 
wide range of situations not explicitly listed in the Convention.115 In particular, 
the Committee stated
112    During the last few years, the EU has demonstrated a specific sensitivity on obesity 
issues. On 30 May 2007, the EU Commission established a coherent and comprehensive 
Community Strategy to address the issues of being overweight and of obesity, by adopt-
ing the White Paper on ‘A Strategy on Nutrition, Overweight, and Obesity-related health 
issues’, focusing on action that can be taken at local, regional, national and European 
levels to reduce the risks associated with poor nutrition and limited physical exercise. 
On the topic, see, amongst others, B. Buchner, ‘Nutrition, Obesity and EU Health Policy’, 
European Health Law Journal, 18(8) (2011) 1-8; A. Faeh, ‘Obesity in Europe: The Strategy of 
the European Union from a Public Health Law Perspective’, European Journal of Health 
Law 19(18) (2012) 69-86; C. MacMaoláin, ‘Food Information Regulation: Failing to address 
ongoing concerns about obesity’, Irish Journal of European Law 17(1) (2014) 77-86.
113    For instance, with reference to the possible impact of Kaltoft in the UK, see M. Butler, 
‘Obesity as a Disability: The Implications or Non-Implications of Kaltoft’, 20(3) (2014) Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues, http://webjcli.org/article/view/358/466, retrieved 14 April 
2015; K. Ferris and J. Marson, ‘Does Disability Begin at 40? Karsten Kaltoft v Kommunernes 
Landsforening (KL), acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund (Advocate General’s 
Opinion) [2014]’, 20(3) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (2014), retrieved 14 April 2015, 
http://webjcli.org/article/view/373.
114    S.C. v. Brazil, CRPD/C/12/D/10/2013, adopted during the 12th session of the Committee, from 
15 September to 3 October 2014. The Committee’s decision was published on 13 November 
2014, while the Kaltoft case was decided on 18 December 2014. The Committee’s decision 
is available online: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.
aspx?symbolno=CRPD-C-12-D-10-2013&Lang=en, retrieved 14 April 2015.
115    The Committee specified that, under Article 1 of the Convention, ‘persons with disabili-
ties include, but are not limited to [emphasis added], those who have long-term physical, 
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the difference between illness and disability is a difference of degree and 
not a difference of kind. A health impairment which initially is conceived 
of as illness can develop into an impairment in the context of disability 
as a consequence of its duration or its chronicity. A human rights-based 
model of disability requires the diversity of persons with disabilities to be 
taken into account.116
Although the language used might appear ambiguous, the Committee theo-
rized a potential overlap between the two concepts analysed, identifying in 
the chronicity or duration of the impairment the mark of distinction between 
them. Nonetheless, it does not clarify any precise standard to be used to dis-
tinguish the two notions. In particular, the ‘duration’ is left quite undefined, 
although it might be argued that the Committee referred to long-term condi-
tions. Even if in Kaltoft there is not any explicit mention of the Committee’s 
decision, at first sight the Court’s approach appears in line with the broad 
interpretation provided by the Committee.
7 Conclusions
Absent an EU-wide legislative definition of the ground of disability, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union has sought to fill this void in a cautious man-
ner. The ratification of the CRPD, in 2010, has led to a clear departure in the 
jurisprudence of the Court: the European judges openly shifted from the medi-
cal model to the social model of disability. The (non)definition provided by the 
CRPD now represents a landmark for the CJEU, which recognised that a duty 
arises to adopt a social model of disability under the principle of consistent 
interpretation, by virtue of the ‘sub-constitutional’ ranking of international 
agreements.117 However, the CJEU’s developments in defining disability within 
the non-discrimination field are producing spillover effects: disability is used 
as an ‘umbrella-term’, encompassing a large variety of different health situa-
tions. This has inevitably had the result of implicitly enlarging the scope of the 
Employment Equality Directive ratione personae. In the most recent case law, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, 
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’. 
116    S.C. v. Brazil, supra note 114, p. 8.
117    Case C-335/05 Řízení Letového Provozu ČR, s. p. v. Bundesamt für Finanzen [2007] ECR 
I-4307; Case C-92/71 Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg [1972] ECR 231; Case 
C-363/12 Z. v. A Government, supra note 57; Case C-356/12, Glatzel, supra note 51.
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in particular Kaltoft, a wide social-model oriented notion of disability has filled 
normative gaps within the EU directive.
Overall, even though it is not certain what influence the CRPD will have in 
the future, nor whether and to what extent the decisions of the UN Committee 
will be adopted in CJEU case law, it remains possible that the Court will con-
tinue with the progressive enlargement of the concept of disability started 
with the Ring and Werge case. The main constraint we envisage relates to the 
CJEU’s role in preserving the internal coherence of the EU legal system: a more 
pronounced overlap of the two concepts of disability and sickness could have 
an even greater impact on EU employment law. Some health conditions, such 
as stress, anxiety and depression, can already be qualified as ‘psychosocial dis-
abilities’. They are amongst the leading causes of sickness absence in Europe,118 
but they are characterized by difficulty of diagnosis and undetermined dura-
tion, and have chronic effects that are highly difficult to predict. In similar bor-
derline cases, a broad interpretation of the concept of disability as a ground 
of discrimination could lead to an enormous amplification of the scope of the 
Employment Equality Directive ratione personae. However, substantially con-
flating the categories of sickness and disability in the non-discrimination field 
could jeopardize the internal coherence of the entire EU system, leading to 
clashes and different levels of protection provided in regards to sickness and 
disability in health and social security legislation. 
118    According to EUROSTAT, in Europe 14% of the persons with a work-related health prob-
lem experienced stress, depression or anxiety as the main health problem. After musculo-
skeletal health problems, this mental health issues constitutes the second most frequently 
reported main work-related health problem. See EUROSTAT, ‘Health and Safety at Work 
in Europe (1999-2007). A Statistical Portrait’, EUROSTAT Statistical Books (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2010), p. 67. Data do not include France.
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